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In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah 
nf1~NNY CRUZ, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
DEPAHT::\fENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECPRI1'Y AND BOARD OF RE-
\' rgw OF THE INDUSTRIAL COM-
jf fSS! ON OF UTAH, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
11354 
STATEMENT OF THE NATrRE OF CASE 
PPtition for rf'view challPnging the Department of 
Emplo~·mpnt Sf'curit~' as affirmed by the Appeals Ref-
1·rpe and tlH· Board of Review of the Industrial Com-
mi:-;c;ioll of Ptah holding appellant, Benny Cruz, to be 
di~qnalifit•d from receiving unemployment benefits pur-
:;11ant to Sf'ction 35-4-5( d) UCA, 1953. 
D fSPOSITION OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Board of Revif'w of the Industrial Commission, 
af'tpr having revit>wed the rt>cord and testimony taken 
hcfore the appeals refert>e, affirmed by a majority vote 
(on<> disst>nt) the dPcision of the appeals referee which 
rlPniPd A]lpellant unemployment compensation on the 
gTounds that h0 was on strike at thP time of his appli-
,·ntion for hPnefit:-;. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the decision of t!J1, 
Board of Review and an order granting him Unrmplo)· 
ment Compensation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant commenced permanent employment 
with Kennecott Copper Corporation on February 24, 
1955 as a heavy equipment operator and continued in 
that employment until .July 15, 1967, wlwn the Unifrrl 
Steelworkers called a strike of tlw KPnnPcott operation~. 
rrhe Appellant, as a mPmber of Operating EnginPPl'S 
Local 3 honored the picket line. This action by the Ap-
pellant did not leave him ·without work. Ap1wllant had 
bePn in fnll time employnwnt ( 40 to 48 honrs per \rPek) 
with Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co. since April 20, 1967 
Appellant's employment with Pioneer was as a hcmy 
equipment operator and both permanent and continnou~: 
lasting for more than five months aftPr the strike wac 
callE"d at Kennecott. 
On December 20, 19G7, Pionec>r laid the Appellant 
off due to inclement WE'ather. It was at this point that 
Appellant first considered himsc>lf unemployed and thm 
entitled to unemplo~·nwnt comrwnsation. According\). 
he filed a claim with tlw Department of Ernploywrnt 
Recnrity, requesting unemployment benefits. The Dr .. 
partnwnt tnnwd down Ap1wllant's n'qnest. .ffr app<'aleil 
to thP. Hoard of HeYiuw of th(' lnclnstrial Commi~sion 
3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DECISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COM-
MISSION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSE 
AND POLICY OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT SECUR-
ITY ACT. 
This is a problem of first impression in this JUns-
didion. In such a sitnation it is not amiss to examine 
tlw purpos(~s of the relPYant legislation in an attempt 
lo find the correct application of the relevant statutes. 
in this effort assistancE~ can be obtained from 33-4-2 
CCA 1 !353, wlwrein tlw legislature set forth the pur-
pmws of tlw Employ111ent Secnrity Act. The policy that 
tl:is Aet pnt into law is that of'' ... reducing the volume 
of" lrn<·mp!oym(_'nt ... "and to provide benefits for periods 
or llIH'1111Jloyuwnt to the end that purchasing power may 
Iii· 11iaintained and that tlw "serions social consequences" 
ol n11Pmployrnent ma.'· be limited. It is with this in mind 
that tlw disqualification of 35-4-5 (1) must be construed. 
Cl(·nrly this sC>ction mnst be interpreted carefully so that 
il is C"(Ttain that no person or group of persons, where 
it was not the intention of the legislature, be disqualified. 
Tltis section is limited in its disqualification to only per-
~ons who an• ont of ·work " ... due to a stoppage of 
\1 ork "·heh exists hecamw of a strike ... " Appellant is 
not out of work ht>canse of the' strike, he is out of work 
ih·eansl' of a la rnff bY Pioneer. It is most likely that . . . 
\ jlpP! lant wonid neyer have applil·d for unemployment 
I 111 r·:ts if his Yrnrk ·with PiOJl('('l" lrn(l not terminated 
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through no fault of his own. (R. 0024) Surely the poli~, 
of the Act is not to discourage people from working harrl 
to care for their own. Also, it is doubtful that the legis 
lature wished to deny assistance to a man who make, 
the effort to contribute to "employment," "increased imr-
chasing power" and maintain his own "employnwnt." 
POINT IL 
APPELLANT IS NOT DISQUALIFIED BY 35-4-5 
(d) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, BECAUSE HE WAS 
NOT OUT OF EMPLOYMENT DUE TO A STRIKE. 
One of the prerc>quisites of disqualification und('r 
35-4-5 ( d) Utah Code Annotah·d is that the claimant lw 
out of employment " ... due to a stoppage of \\'ork 
which exists because of a strike involving his ... group 
of ·workers. . . " 
The strike at Kl•nnecott was not the cause of Ap-
pellant's unemployment. Rather it was his layoff l1y 
Pioneer that caused his nnemplo~anent. EvPn after tli1 
strike had started appellant was engaged in full tillw 
permanent work and \rnnld hm-e continued ind0finitelY 
had he not been laid off. 
POINT IIL 
APPELLANT'S LAST PLACE OF EMPLOY-
1\IENT WAS PIONEER SAND AND GRAVEL COl\l-
P ANY. 
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Section 35-4-5 UCA 1953 ( d) is as follows: 
"An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or 
for purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
( d) For any week ... that his unemployment is 
due to a stoppage of work which exists because 
of a strike involving his grade, . . . at the ... 
establishment at which he'iwas last employed." 
(emphasis added) 
Such statutes should be construed liberally to pro-
vide hPnefits to the claimant Scott v. Smith, supra. 
With this principle of construction in mind it is 
dPar that appellant was last employed by Pioneer. Pio-
llPt>l' was the last place appellant worked and it was the 
last place that paid him. 'J111at this is the proper result 
is clear from the following cases: Bruly v. Industrial 
Comm., 101 So. 2d 22 (Fla); Hopkins v. California Em-
vloyment Comm., 151 P.2d 229, 154 ALR 1084 and La-
/Ji11sky v. Florida Industrial Comm., 167 So. 2d 620 (Fla). 
In the Bruly case the court construed a statute similar 
tu our 35-4-5 ( d) UCA 1953 and held that a person who 
haJ gone on strike and then taken subsequent employ-
111Pnt which lasted for nine months was last employed 
11~ the subsequent employer. The following expression 
from that case demonstrates the reasonable approach of 
tltat e.ourt: 
"N"ot on!Y is it contrary to the wording of the 
statute, l;ut it is unr<>al.istic to say that the ap-
pel lant'i.; nnemploynwnt status for th<> weeks fol-
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lowing his discharge after nine months' emploi 
ment ... constituted nnemployment due to a lab 1~ 1 
dispute at a place wherP he was last employt>rl." 
This is the proper constrnction of statntes snrl1 a' 
35-4-5 ( d). To give it the construction placed upon it by 
the Indnstrial Commission wonld be unduly harsl1 and 
would disregard the rule that snch statutes should lw 
constrned liberally. 
POINT IV. 
THE INDUSTRIAL BOARD'S CHARACTERIZA-
TION OF APPELLANT'S EMPLOYMENT WITH 
PIONEER AS "STOP GAP" IS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The Board of ReviPw of the Industrial Conuni~~i1n1 
found ap1wllant's em1iloy11wnt ·with Pi01wvr to Le "tlloJI 
Gap": temporary employment. In so doing the Boan! 
relied upon the Montana case of Scott 1J. Smith, 276 P.~d 
72:1. 
That case involvt>d employrPs, who \\'C'nt ont on 
strike• against their rei:.,i1Jlar emplo.Yer and who obtaimd. 
·during the five month labor dispnte, some other klll-
porary work. It shonld he ohsNvPd that their ··~4to1 1 
Uap" employment was obtained suhsP<pwnt to tlH' lwgiu 
ning of the strik<> and that it 1n1s frmporary in natur1'· 
This is not tnw of U]lfll'llant Cn 1 z. He obtained ern1:!il°' 
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nli'nt with Pioneer Sand and Gravel Company approxi-
rnatt>l:· three months before the Kennecott strike and 
<'ontinuPd in that employment on a permanent basis for 
fin~ months after the strike had started. In Scott v. 
t..,'111ifh, supra, it is apparent that the Montana court's 
rnling a1Jplies only to "temporary" employment, obtained 
aftrr a strikt' or in anticipation of it, whereas, in the 
l1l'('SP11t esae there is absolutely no evidence in the record 
to indi<'atc~ that appellant's job with Pioneer Sand and 
(irawl was anything other than permanent in its nature 
nor that he acquired that work in anticipation of the 
'trikP. 
POINT V. 
THERE IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE 
THAT STRIKING EMPLOYEES ARE NOT EN-
TITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND 
APPELLANT IS WITHIN THAT EXCEPTION. 
TJw case of Scott 1;. Smith, supra, which the Board 
ol' H<TiPw rPlied npon adopts the so-called "good faith" 
''Xl'P}ltion. That Pxception is clearly presented in the 
<'a:.:p of Bruley L Florida Industrial Commission, supra. 
TliP "good faith" Pxception of this case is that employ-
lll<'nt, with other than the strnck company, entered in 
.:.;nod faith and rt>garded by the employee as permanent, 
will l'l'lllOVl' the disqualification of statntPs similar to 
l' :3:-J--1--f> (d) FCA 1953. It is clear that the Montana 
rnnrt has acct'pted this position. In the ca::w of Scott v. 
"'n1ith, snpra, that court madP th(• following statPrnent: 
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"lt would readily be set>n that none of tlu•sp ca~,,, 
d<>viatr from the principle we han lwretofoit· 
outlined, in fact the Bergen casP and the Bnih 
case are rlearl>- d<'ci<lPd within tlwse principJP, ;, 
This statt'rnent \\·as made after that court had ~e1 
forth tlw "good faith" rule of the BrnlY casP. 'rlwri-
fon·, it appears that if tlw Montana court was ro11 
fronted with a situation, such as tht- irnstant onP, wlwrP 
there is ample and nnrehutted evidence that the clairnant 
had takt•n his Sl:'cond job for an indefinite time on a 
permanent basis (R 0021) and in good faith (R. 002;lJ 
it ·woukl acct>pt tlw "good faith" rule aml rPrnon tlw 
disqualification. 
THEREFORE, it is clear that the Board of Hevie\1 
madP an error of law when it r<'lii·d upon tlH· ca~(' 1il 
Scott v. Smith, supra. Ha<l it properly appli<'Cl that ea"' 
to the instant situation, it would ha,-<> grantPd UJH'lll-
ployment hendits to thP appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
The policy of the J<~mploynwnt Security Ad is t11 
reduce nnemployrnt>nt and to avoid tlw attPndant (•riJ, 
of unemployment. l ts purpose is also to provide bP11dit.-
to those who art> out of t>mployrn<'nt through no fniii' 
of thPir own. App<'llant's lack of ·work occlllT<'d hecan·' 
of a layoH from fnll ti11H' pl·nnmwnt ('ltlplo>·11wnt. 'l'hi•r• 
fon•, lw is Pntitled to tlw h('Jl<'fih of tliP ~\d. 
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'l1he decision of the Board of Review denying un-
employment benefits to appellant is not founded in the 
evidence before them. It is also apparent that the au-
thority relied upon from their decision if properly applied 
wonld result in the opposite conclusion than the one 
they reached. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MITSUNAGA & ROSS 
By ..................................................... . 
Galen Ross 
Attorney for Appellant 
